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ABSTRACT — Correlated anomaly detection (CAD) from 
streaming data is a type of group anomaly detection and an 
essential task in useful real-time data mining applications like 
botnet detection, financial event detection, industrial process 
monitor, etc. The primary approach for this type of detection 
in previous researches is based on the principal score (PS) of 
each sliding window by computing top eigenvalues of the 
correlation matrix, e.g. the Lanczos algorithm. This paper 
demonstrates the phenomenon of principal score degeneration 
for large data set, and then mathematically and practically 
prove all current PS-based methods are bound to fail for 
anomalous correlation detection on large-scale streaming data, 
even when the number of correlated anomalies grows with the 
data size at a reasonable rate; in reality, anomalies tend to be 
the minority of the data, and this issue can be more serious. We 
propose a framework with two novel randomized algorithms 
rPS and gPS for better detection of correlated anomalies from 
large streaming data of various correlation strength. The 
experiment shows high and balanced recall and estimated 
accuracy of our framework for anomaly detection from a large 
server log data set and a U.S. stock daily price data set in 
comparison to direct principal score evaluation and some other 
recent group anomaly detection algorithms. Moreover, our 
techniques significantly improve the computation efficiency 
and scalability for principal score calculation. 
Keywords - Group Anomaly Detection, Correlation, Principal 
Score, Streaming Data, Big Data 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Anomaly detection is an active research topic of long 
history, which aims to discover abnormal pattern that deviates 
from the vast common. Although a majority of algorithms find 
anomalies as individuals [1], some other algorithms aim at 
discovering anomaly groups rather than single individuals, for 
example, [2], [3], [4], [5] and [6]. The individuals in each 
anomaly group need not appear to be anomalous by themselves, 
but collectively they become noticeably different from others. 
These models are classic, either define an anomaly score to 
search for a subset with large score, or devise a probabilistic 
model that finds observations with small probabilities. In this 
paper, we refer to an anomaly group as an anomaly set. 
Our research is about one type of group anomaly detection, 
called correlated anomaly detection (CAD), and we focus on 
data streams. CAD assumes the normal data entries in data 
streams are weakly correlated or at least not strongly correlated 
for most of the time, and strong correlations can be considered 
unlikely and anomalous. A group of data entries are correlated 
anomalies if they have strong internal correlations. We only 
consider Pearson’s correlation.  
Correlated anomalies are relatively less studied in literature 
than classic group anomalies, they actually have interesting 
industrial applications. For example, the botnet detection is to 
find correlated intrusion detection [7], or malicious server visits 
from distributed denial of service (DDOS) attackers, price 
scraping system, and ill-will web crawlers [8] [9]. For another 
example, the correlated price changes in stock markets is an 
indicator of potential financial events [10]. Furthermore, 
anomalous correlation is applied in studying chemical process 
[11], industrial process [12] and sensor data [13]. We discuss 
two problems in detail for intuitive understanding of what CAD 
problems we are dealing with, 
• Correlated server requests. Suppose a web server receives 
requests from 𝑁 different IPs for a time window (e.g. 1 hour) 
where 𝑁 is a relatively large number (e.g. tens of thousands 
or even higher). Suppose these 𝑁  IPs have requested 𝑀 
different files on the server during this period, then we can 
construct a 𝑀×𝑁 matrix 𝐑 where 𝐑(𝑖, 𝑗) is the number of 
times the 𝑗th IP request the 𝑖th file within this hour. Let 𝐑(⋅, 𝑗) denote the 𝑗th column of 𝐑. If we randomly sample a 
few columns from 𝐑, they are usually weakly correlated or 
at least strongly correlated, because normally we can assume 
requests from different IPs are independently made by 
different people following different visit patterns. Our 
objective is to determine if there is anomalously strong 
correlation among some IPs, i.e. if there exist a subset of IPs 
indexed by 𝑗+,… , 𝑗- s.t. the column vectors 𝐑(⋅, 𝑗+),… , 𝐑(⋅, 𝑗-) have strong internal correlation. It is possible these IPs 
are used by some coordinated distributed automatic 
programs (e.g. botnet) for malicious purposes like 
information scraping or DDOS attacks. Figure 1(a) demos 
an example of a confirmed botnet actually captured by our 
algorithms. 
• Correlated stock fluctuations. Suppose we have 𝑁 stocks in 
the market. For each stock, its price changes within a time 
window (e.g. one month) can be converted into a vector of 
price-change percentages. For example, if the prices are 
$19.2, $19.7, $18.5, $18.3, $19.0, …, then the price-change 
percentages are 2.6%, -6.2%, -1.1%, +3.8%, … Suppose 
every stock have 𝑀 + 1 price records in this time period, 
then we can have a 𝑀 ×𝑁 matrix 𝐅 such that 𝐅(𝑖, 𝑗) is the 𝑖 th price-change percentage for the 𝑗 th stock. Similar to 
above, our objective is to determine if there is a subset of 
stocks whose price changes are correlated. Such strong 
correlation is actually rare given a sufficiently long period 
and sufficiently many price changes, even for stocks from 
the same industry. For example, we tested correlations for 
price changes of stocks in gold industry for 12000 30-day 
time windows; we found on average two gold stocks show 
strong price-change correlation (above threshold 0.7) for 
about 45 of these time windows, illustrated in Figure 1(b).  
Stocks from other industries have similar results. Therefore, 
these strong correlations can be a good indicator of a 
financial event. 
* Equal contribution to this research. 
 
  
(a) captured network of crawlers (b) captured correlated stocks 
Figure 1. (a) A crawler network identified from a large server log 
dataset. The network comes from a company named Anturis, where 
some IPs are listed on their website (so we confirm these IPs come form 
this company). This botnet causes multiple alters when our algorithms 
run through the server log data stream. The edge weights are average 
request correlations between two IPs in these alerts. (b) The labels along 
both sides of the matrix are stock symbols whose full name can be found 
online. In each matrix cell, the integer at the bottom is the number of 
times the price changes of the two stocks have strong correlation (higher 
than 0.7) among 12000+ 30-day time windows, the decimal at the top is 
the average of these price-change correlation if they are above the 
threshold. This illustrates that strong price-change correlation is rare and 
can be considered anomalous. 
CAD is technically different from classic detection because 
data entries are not considered anomalous if they do not exhibit 
strong internal correlation, even if they are “unlikely” to be 
observed by a classic detector. Therefore, classic models 
mentioned in the first paragraph are generally not employed in 
current CAD researches; rather, current CAD researches are 
mainly based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and 
almost all researches on CAD deal with streaming data and 
monitor the anomalies on the fly; however, as far as we know, 
recent algorithmic development is insufficient to better catch up 
with the ever-growing data scale. Recent algorithms for 
detecting anomalies from streaming data, such as [14], [15], 
[16], [17], [18], are only good for extraction of individual 
anomalous data vectors from the streams, and also they are not 
targeting correlated anomalies. 
We now overview how “big data” brings modern 
challenges to correlated anomaly detection. A canonical 
approach is to set a sliding window on the data stream, 
converting data entries in the window into a feature matrix, and 
run PCA on the feature matrix. If the principal score (the 
eigenvalue associated with the principal component divided by 
the number of entries) is higher than a threshold, say 0.7, it 
means plenty of data points are scattered around the rotated axis 
defined by the principal component and thus correlated. We find 
the challenges to extend this approach to large-scale streaming 
data is two-fold.  
• First challenge, the anomalous correlation is significantly 
weakened. On one hand, a time window of a large data 
stream could contain a large amount of uncorrelated normal 
data entries that overwhelm the anomalous correlation 
regardless how strong it is. Later Figure 2 illustrates even 
under realistic assumption like the anomaly data take up a 
fixed portion of the total data, the principal score still 
asymptotically degenerates to 0.5 when the data size grows. 
A rigorous discussion and a proof is provided in Section 
III.B. On the other hand, anomalies are trying to hide 
themselves, which makes the situation even worse. For 
example, a botnet can simulate human-like visits on a server 
where each individual bot looks very normal, hard to be 
discovered by single-anomaly detectors, but altogether they 
still impose a heavy burden [19]. We refer to this problem 
as principal score degeneration, and we propose this issue 
needs to be prevented before a PCA-based approach can 
actually be extended to large-scale streams. 
• Second challenge, we need to reduce the algorithmic time 
complexity. Principal score computation is intense with its 
sub-cubic time complexity and might not a feasible solution 
to monitor large-scale streaming data. What is worse, 
industrial application could require simultaneous real-time 
analysis with different window sizes from 15 mins to half 
day. The current PCA-based methods either need to skip a 
large part of the streaming data [8], which is not applicable 
for online analysis, or focus on speeding up the eigenvalue 
algorithms by a small order [19, 20]. 
Consequently, we believe current researches are insufficient 
for the purpose of mining correlated anomalies from large data 
streaming. This paper proposes two related algorithms to meet 
the challenge. The first algorithm comes with the idea that we 
could sample from the data with a distribution that favors 
potential correlated anomalies based on “strong anomaly 
strength” assumption to be introduced later. The sampling not 
just makes the algorithm more sensitive to “hidden” correlations, 
and meanwhile it reduces unnecessary computation. We name 
both the algorithm and the principal score it generates as rPS 
(Randomized PS). The second algorithm models the 
correlation matrix from a novel generative perspective. It is 
completely different from the typical mix of LDA and Gaussian 
mixture [21] for classic group anomaly detection. To our best 
knowledge, we could be the first to attempt a generative model 
for the correlated anomaly detection. The second algorithm 
does not make strong assumptions and is capable of mining 
correlated anomalies even when the first algorithm cannot 
properly detect them. We name the algorithm and the principal 
score it generates as gPS (Generative PS). The two algorithms 
rPS and gPS make a good partner where the output of the 
first algorithm can be used to initialize the second algorithm.  
We perform experiments on two datasets. The first is a large 
server log data set of 315 million log entries; the second is a 
stock price dataset of 30+ years daily price data. The 
experiments show the proposed algorithms can achieve much 
better performance in terms of recall and estimated accuracy, in 
comparison to PCA-based methods [12, 19] and two additional 
models [3, 6] as representatives of afore-mentioned classic 
group anomaly detection methods (to show they do not work for 
CAD even with tweaks as best as we can), and the computation 
time is dramatically reduced. 
We summarize the main contribution of this paper as the 
theoretical discussion and proof of principal score degeneration, 
and the two algorithms to overcome this issue, as well as the 
experiments on two real-world datasets. In Section III, we start 
with theoretical discussion that points the way for development 
of two algorithms rPS and gPS. In Section IV, we first observe 
qualitative results consistent with the discussion of Section III, 
and then conduct quantitative experiments to compare 
performance. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Group anomaly detection is more difficult than individual 
anomaly detection because it involves exploration of underlying 
data structure and the design of unlikeliness measure for 
observations. For example, [2] trains “boxes” in the feature 
space for each data stream from multiple “normal” streams and 
then merge nearby boxes. The distance from a data point to the 
closest box is its anomaly score. [6] detects anomaly groups on 
a graph. It defines an anomalous “metric” for each node and 
edge. The algorithm starts with all nodes of the graph as an 
anomaly group, and for each iteration the algorithm tries to 
remove one node from the group that best increase the group’s 
anomaly score. The method is simple and intuitive, and its 
simplicity leads to a mathematical error bound. In comparison, 
[3] builds a generative model that combines Latent Dirichlet 
Allocation (LDA) and Gaussian mixture, and an observation 
with small probability under the model is naturally considered 
an anomaly. Other researches like [4, 5, 22] etc. generally 
follow the two schemes. 
Among all above methods we reviewed, we find only [6] 
could be applied to correlated anomaly detection, even 
correlation is not considered by design. The algorithm starts 
with the entire graph, then in each step it keeps removing the 
node with the least sum of edge weights plus node weights. The 
sum of edge weights and node weights of the remaining 
subgraph divided by the number of nodes is the anomaly score. 
In this way, it effectively searches for a denser subgraph of high 
anomaly score, thus noticeable correlation could be expected if 
it can truly find a dense subgraph. 
Correlated anomaly detection (CAD) falls in the category of 
group anomaly detection, but its approaches in previous 
researches are very different from those for the classic group 
anomaly detection, since in this case the unlikeliness is solely 
measured by correlation. The primary technique for CAD is 
PCA [8, 19, 20, 23, 24], technically computing the top 
eigenvalues and their eigenvectors. The principal score is 
calculated by dividing the largest eigenvalue by the data size; it 
provides a unified correlation score supported by well-
developed statistical and numerical theory. PCA can also be 
applied in classic anomaly detection for a different purpose -- 
dimension reduction [25, 26].  Although CAD typically 
involves streaming data since the beginning, none of the above-
mentioned works can directly apply to large-scale streams, due 
to the principal score degeneration. Meanwhile, as far as we 
know, the best time complexity reported from previous works 
is sub-cubic [12, 19, 27], still intensive for large-scale monitor 
and involving much unnecessary calculation that could be 
avoided. 
III. MODEL AND INFERENCE 
A. Problem Statement 
Given a data matrix 𝐗 = (𝐱+,… , 𝐱4) where each column 𝐱5 
is a data vector and 𝑛 is very large, we intend to discover a 
subset of the data vectors in 𝐗, called anomalies, with strong 
internal anomalous correlation, that is, most pairs of the 
detected anomalies have strong pairwise positive or negative 
correlations. Define correlation matrix 𝐏 as an 𝑛 × 𝑛  matrix 
consisting of pairwise correlations between every pair of data 
vectors in 𝐗 . The diagonal elements of 𝐏  are clearly all 1 
because self-correlation is always 1. We make all correlations 
in 𝐏 lie in [0,1] by taking absolute values in order for 𝐏 to be a 
positive semi-definite matrix as well as a non-negative matrix. 
Note this operation of taking absolute values will not affect the 
generality of our detection theory and algorithm. After detection 
of anomalies, the sign of pair-wise correlations can be recovered 
by re-calculate the pairwise correlations among the anomalies; 
since the number of detected correlated anomalies is typically 
small, this recovery will be of negligible cost. In other cases, if 
it is intended to only discover positive correlated anomalies, we 
can simply do another operation of setting negative values in 𝐏 
as zero; if it is intended to only discover negative correlated 
anomalies, we can set positive values in 𝐏 as zero and then 
analyze −𝐏 instead. Therefore, in a word, no matter which case, 
we can consider 𝐏 as a non-negative matrix without loss of 
generality of our theory and algorithms.  
Denote the largest eigenvalue of 𝐏 as 𝜆+, then 𝜌(𝐗) = >?4 ∈[0,1] is called the principal score. The anomaly detection task 
is based on following assumption.  
Assumption 1. Normal data entries have weak or at least non-
strong correlation. Therefore, when 𝜌(𝐗) is closer to 1 , then it 
implies more likelihood that 𝐗 may contain correlated anomalies. 
The objective is thus to compute 𝜌(𝐗). If 𝜌 > 𝜌B for some 
threshold 𝜌B  (say 𝜌B = 0.7 ), we should emphasize lowering 
threshold 𝜌B  is dangerous and generally not a good practice 
because of the “weak correlation” in Assumption 1, and 𝜌B =0.7 is an intuitively reasonable value, and it is also supported by 
our experiment results (see Table 1, lowering threshold causes 
many false positives). If 𝜌 > 𝜌B, we then consider anomalous 
correlation in the data is possible, and an alert can be raised for 
human attention. Along with calculation of 𝜆+ , the principal 
component (eigenvectors of 𝜆+ ) can be found, and any data 
entry with strong correlation to it are considered as correlated 
anomalies. For streaming data, a usual practice is to either 
divide the data stream into batches or use a sliding window.  
B. Principal Score Degeneration 
We now show the intrinsic problem of using principal score 𝜌 for detecting correlated anomalies from large-scale streaming 
data. A time window may contain tens of thousands of data 
entries where usually only a portion of them are anomalous and 
show unusual strong correlation. They will be overwhelmed by 
other “large number of” normal data entries when computing 𝜌. 
The magnitude of the anomalies does not help the detection 
because correlation is insensitive to magnitude, e.g. the 
correlation between two vectors 𝐱+ = (1,0,2,2,0,1) and 𝐱F =(0,0,1,2,1,1)  is the same as the correlation between 𝐲+ =(10,0,20,20,0,10) and 𝐲F = (0,0,10,20,10,10). This is unlike 
classic single-anomaly detection where large vectors can be 
more easily detected. For a concrete example, in case of 
detecting malicious server visits (bot detection), even the 
attackers try to impose heavy workload to bring the server down, 
because they are the “small number” in comparison to the total 
number of users, 𝜌  would still be nowhere near the alert 
threshold. It is also imaginable the problem is more serious if 
the data size grows. We call this phenomenon as principal score 
degeneration. Although this is intuitively true, a rigorous proof 
is difficult and non-trivial.  
In practice, it is of course reasonable to assume the anomaly 
set could grow with the data size. For example, if the server is 
capable of processing more requests, an attacker could invest 
more computers. It is interesting to ask 1) if the anomaly sets 
could still be overwhelmed if they grow with the data size; 2) 
which value 𝜌 is expected to degenerate to?  
One contribution of this paper is we found a rigorous 
mathematical proof to answer above questions under the 
following Assumption 2 which real-world datasets generally 
satisfy. We discover theoretically 𝜌 will be overwhelmed even 
if the anomaly set grows almost at the same order as the data 
size, and the actually calculated 𝜌 (not just its expectation 𝔼𝜌) 
will be guaranteed to degenerate to the background correlation 𝜇  (the average of all correlations excluding those anomaly-
anomaly correlations). The discovery strongly implies it is 
inappropriate to directly apply any principal-score based 
algorithm on a large data set. In the proof, we assume the whole 
data set is of size 𝑛 + 𝑘 + 1 where 𝑘 is the number of correlated 
anomalies in the data set. In the proof and future discussion, 
abbreviation “s.t.” stands for “such that”, and “w.r.t.” stands for 
“with respect to”. 
Assumption 2. The average of the correlations between normal 
data entries in 𝐗 do not exceed the alert level 𝜌B. This is a very loose 
assumption which real-world datasets will generally satisfy. 
Proposition 1. Principal Score Asymptotic Upper Bound. Given 
data matrix 𝐗 of 𝑛 + 𝑘 + 1 columns with 𝑘 = 𝑂(𝑛L),𝑚 ∈ [0,1) 
anomalies of high mutual correlation, and assume all other absolute 
correlations are independent random numbers in [0,1] with mean 𝜇 
and finite variance 𝜎F. If we fix 𝑘 and let 𝑛 → ∞, then 𝜌(𝐗) ≤ 𝜇 +𝑜 S +4𝓂U  for any 0 ≤𝓂 < min Z+F , 1 − 𝑚[	  with probability 
arbitrarily near 1, and 𝔼𝜌 → 𝜇. Here 𝑂 and 𝑜 are standard big-O 
and little-o notation. 
Proof. Let 𝐏 be the correlation matrix, and 𝑠5 be the sum of the 𝑖th 
row of 𝐏. Since 𝐏 is non-negative, then Perron-Frobenius theorem 
implies ^_`ab4 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ ^cdab4 . By assumption, 𝑠5 ≤ 1 + 𝑘 + 𝑛𝑋 
where 𝑋 is a random variable of the same distribution from which 
the random correlation is drawn, then we have  𝔼[𝑠5]𝑛 = 1 + 𝑘 + 𝑛𝔼𝑋𝑛 → 𝜇, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 ⇒ 𝔼𝜌 → 𝜇 
Let ?̃?5 be the sum of the 𝑖th row excluding the diagonal and the 
correlations involving the 𝑘 anomalies, then 𝑠5 ≤ 𝑘 + 1 + ?̃?5. If 𝐱5 
is non-anomaly, then ?̃?5  is the sum of 𝑛  i.i.d. random variables; 
otherwise ?̃?5  is the sum of 𝑛 + 1  i.i.d. random variables. We 
discuss for non-anomaly without loss of generality. 
Given any 𝜖 > 0, let 𝑥 be a number determined by equation 𝜖 =+√Fk 4l 𝑒nopp . Let 𝓃r,s be the number of 𝑟-tuples of row sums at least 𝑆 = 𝑛𝜇 + 𝑥√𝑛𝜎F. As 𝑛 → ∞, we have 𝔼v𝓃r,sw = S𝑛𝑟UxℙS𝑠5 ≥ 𝑛𝜇 + 𝑥{𝑛𝜎FU|r ~S𝑛𝑟U~ 1√2𝜋𝑒nlpFl r ~ 𝑛!𝑟! (𝑛 − 𝑟)!𝑛r ~ 𝑛√2𝜋𝑥𝑒nlpF r → 𝜖r𝑟!  
where abn4√p4  is standard normal by central limit theorem and ∫ +√Fk 𝑒noppl ~ +√Fkl 𝑒nopp . Let 𝓃s  be the number of row sums at 
least 𝑆 , then 𝓃r,s = S𝓃s𝑟 U ⇒ 𝔼[𝓃s(𝓃s − 1)…(𝓃s − 𝑟 + 1)] =𝜖r. We can check the coefficient of 𝓃s5 , 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑟 in the product 
inside the expectation equals Z𝑟𝑖[ (2nd kind Sterling number). This 
implies the 𝑟th moment 𝔼[𝓃sr] of 𝓃s is exactly the 𝑟th moment of 
a Poisson random variable for any 𝑟 = 1,… , 𝑛 . By Carleman’s 
condition[28], 𝓃s  obeys Poisson distribution parameterized by 𝜖, 
implying  ℙxmax ?̃?5𝑛 < 𝜇 + 𝑥𝜎√𝑛| = ℙ(𝓃s = 1) = 𝑒n 
Finally, we can in particular let 𝜖 = +{k  4, then it is easily seen ℙ~^cdab4 < 𝜇 + 𝜎F44 + -+4  ≈ 1  when 𝑛  is large. With 𝜌 ≤^cdab4 , -+4 = 𝑂S +4?U and 44 = 𝑜 S-+4 U when 𝑚 ∈ S+F , 1U, we 
have 𝜌 ≤ 𝜇 + 𝑜 S +4𝓂U  for any 0 ≤𝓂 < min Z+F , 1 − 𝑚[   with 
probability arbitrarily near 1. ∎ 
Proposition 1 affirms the eventual failure of methods based 
on just calculating or approximate the principal score of the 
entire correlation matrix, as those mentioned in related works: 
it literally means even if the number of correlated anomalies has 
a reasonable growth rate with strong anomalous correlation, 
they will be “ignored” when provided a large amount of other 
normal data, and the principal score has no chance to exceed the 
mean of background correlation plus a small perturbation. We 
note Proposition 1 only gives the upper bound, so the actual case 
could be worse. A numerical illustration is given in Figure 2. 
Originally about 50% of the data are anomalies with average 
correlation 0.85. We randomly add both anomalous and normal 
data. The first chart keeps 𝑘 = 𝑛., which falls in the domain 
of Proposition 1. The second chart keeps 𝑘 = 0.2𝑛, growing at 
the same order as 𝑛, yet the principal score degenerates anyway. 
  
Figure 2 Degeneration of Principal Score. The growing rate of the left is 𝑘 = 𝑛. (falls in the range specified in Proposition 1), of the right is 𝑘 =0.2𝑛. 
C. Randomized PS 
Our first randomized algorithm tries to resolve above 
problem and extend the principal-score based method to large 
streaming data that satisfies “strong anomaly strength” 
assumption defined below. Such anomalies are of big concern 
in applications like bot detection or intrusion detection. Our 
technique falls in the category of randomized algorithms [29-
31] of the numerical computation society. Although there have 
been many such algorithms for PCA or SVD and techniques like 
interpolation, QR factorization, subspace iteration, etc., their 
goal is to preserve the principal score and principal components, 
so the approximated eigenvalues of the correlation matrix can 
be as accurate as possible. However, extreme accuracy is not 
very needed in our application, and in contrast our randomized 
algorithm does the opposite: it needs to noticeably increase the 
principal score. We now introduce a second proposition, which 
reveals what conditions can prevent the principal score from 
being overwhelmed as seen in Proposition 1, and also serves as 
the correctness for later proposed sampling technique. The 
proof is based on the random matrix theory [32]. 
Proposition 2. Asymptotic Concentration of Correlation with 
Anomalies. Suppose 𝑘F − 𝑘  anomalous correlations in an 𝑛 × 𝑛 
correlation matrix 𝐏  are random numbers in [0,1] with 𝜇B  as its 
mean, and all other correlation are independent random numbers in [0,1]  with mean 𝜇  s.t. 𝜇 < 𝜇B . As 𝑛 → ∞ , if -4 → 𝜑  for some 
constant 𝜑 ∈ (0,1), then 𝜌 concentrates around 𝜇 + (𝜇B − 𝜇)𝜑F ±𝑂 S +√4U. 
Proof. Use random matrix theory. With large 𝑛 , every element 
above the diagonal of 𝐏 can be viewed i.i.d. generated by two steps: 
with probability 𝜑F it is drawn from a distribution with mean 𝜌B, 
and with probability 1 − 𝜑F, it is drawn from a distribution with 
mean 𝜇. Thus, the mixed distribution has mean 𝜑F𝜇B + (1 − 𝜑F)𝜇, 
and 𝐏√4 is a Hermitian Wigner matrix (diagonal is constant in our 
case, elements above the diagonal are i.i.d.). By its property [32], 
the top eigenvalue of 𝐏  concentrates around (𝜑F𝜇B + (1−𝜑F)𝜇)𝑛 ± 𝑂√𝑛 , so the principal score 𝜌  concentrates around 𝜇 + (𝜇B − 𝜇)𝜑F ± 𝑂S +√4U. ∎ 
In plain words, 𝜑 = -4 is the percentage of the anomalies, 𝜇B 
is the mean correlation between anomalies, and 𝜇B − 𝜇  is the 
difference between the average anomalous correlation and the 
average normal correlation. Proposition 2 implies two 
conditions for the principal-score based method to work well 
for large data set: 1) the number of anomalies keeps taking a 
sufficiently large percentage, 2) and the anomalous correlation 
is sufficiently distinguishable from the normal correlation. 
Satisfy both conditions, then 𝜌(𝐗) will be theoretically above 𝜇 
by a noticeable non-diminishing quantity. It is also not hard to 
verify the two conditions are not only sufficient, but also 
necessary, because we have proved in Proposition 1 that any 
sub-𝑛 growth order of anomalies will eventually make 𝜌(𝐗) no 
bigger than 𝜇.  
The second condition is an intrinsic property of the data set, 
and we cannot change it; but we could make the data satisfy the 
first condition through sampling, if the anomalies can have 
higher probability to be sampled. We should in addition note 
although Proposition 2 suggests an apoptotic constant -4  is 
theoretically enough, given the result of Figure 1, we should 
allow sampling more anomalies. 
Definition 1. Let 𝐴 = 𝐱5?, … , 𝐱5 be a set of correlated anomalies 
in 𝐗 , define 𝜙(𝐴) = ∑  𝐱b¡ ¢¡£?∑ ‖𝐱b‖¢¥b£?  for some 𝑝 ≥ 1  as the anomaly 
strength of 𝐴 in 𝐗 of order 𝑝 (i.e. with respect to the 𝑝-norm). Note 
anomaly strength defined in this way is independent from the size 
of an anomaly set; a small anomaly set (small 𝑘) might have strong 
strength if they have large-magnitude data vectors; a large anomaly 
set can have strong anomaly strength even if each anomaly consists 
of normal quantities.  
Assumption 3. Strong anomaly strength assumption. Big quantity 
in a data vector tends to be anomalous, and an anomaly set has 
sufficiently strong strength.  
Above assumption is not unusual in practice and is a 
primary concern for many cases. In bot/botnet detection, 
anomaly strength is equivalent to traffic volume, and above 
assumption covers the case when abnormal visits impose a 
noticeable workload on the server, either to slow down the 
server, or to intensively collect information. In stock/exchange 
market, above assumption covers the case when many 
stocks/currencies show small correlated fluctuations, or a few 
stocks/currencies show huge correlated fluctuations; both have 
meaningful implication for financial market [33].  
We propose random sampling with replacement according 
to 𝑝-norm for 𝑝 ≥ 1 from the data entries to form a new matrix 
on which the principal score is computed. Each data entry 𝐱 has 
probability ‖𝐱‖¢∑ ‖𝐱b‖¢¥b£?  to be sampled. We refer to both this 
technique and the principal score evaluated from the sample as 
rPS (Randomized PS). Under above-mentioned assumption, if 
the anomaly set has strength 𝜙, then this ensures the number of 
anomalies are expected to make up ratio 𝜙 of the sampled data, 
regardless how large the anomaly set is. By Proposition 2, the 
principal score is likely to be around 𝜇 + (𝜇B − 𝜇)𝜙 and will be 
noticeably above the normal data mean correlation if 𝜙  is 
sufficiently large.  
The parameter 𝑝  controls sampling sensitivity to large 
quantities and how strong the strength should be, as stated in 
Assumption 3, such large quantities tend to be anomalous. 
However, larger 𝑝 might increase the chance of false alarm by 
potential sampling multiple times the same large vector. The 
other parameter is sampling ratio (sampled size divided by the 
data set size), denoted by 𝓇. The parameter tuning is shown in 
section IV.C. We can apply the Lanczos algorithm with sub-
cubic time complexity to evaluate the principal score. The time 
complexity of rPS is at the same order of underlying PS 
algorithm applied on the sample, but with a much smaller 
coefficient 𝓇F ≪ 1. 
D. Generative PS 
We have two main motivations to bring up a second 
algorithm. First, sometimes it is possible the anomaly strength 
in data is weak, for example, crawlers could collect information 
from a popular website at a mild visiting rate in order to protect 
themselves from exposure. For the stock price dataset, unlike 
the server logs data set where anomalies prevail, it is not usual 
for a large number of stocks to fluctuate in a correlated way. 
When “strong anomaly strength” assumption as in Assumption 
3 does not hold, it is not easy to directly find useful information 
for sampling. Secondly, we find from our experiments that rPS 
has a noticeable chance to raise false alerts and makes incorrect 
identifications.  
The design of gPS is based on the same idea as rPS to favor 
principal score evaluation on potential anomalies. In the proof 
of Proposition 2 we can see the correlation matrix can be viewed 
as being “generated”. Inspired by this, we propose a generative 
view of correlation matrix to infer the anomaly sets.  
Assumption 4. Each anomaly set has strong internal correlation 
among themselves but have much weaker external correlation to 
other data entries. We believe this is generally true for all data sets. 
It might not be hard for anomalies to have “camouflage” by 
simulating the quantities of normal data entries, but it would be 
very difficult for them to well simulate realistic correlations. 
We refer to the following model and its principal score as 
gPS (Generative PS). We assume there are 𝓀 anomaly sets in 
the data, where each anomaly set is associated with two 
parameters 𝑎5, 𝑏5, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝓀  s.t. 𝑎5 + 𝑏5 ≥ 1  and ¬b¬b­b ≥ 𝒶5 
for some 𝒶5 ≥ 𝒶 for some 𝒶 > 0.5. The first restriction keeps 
the beta distribution to have a valid shape for our purpose; the 
second constraint 𝒶 is the average correlation between two data 
entries in an anomaly set, which intuitively should be a value 
near the threshold 𝜌B and based on Table 2 we choose 𝒶 = 0.75. 
There is one additional pair of parameters 𝑎𝓀+, 𝑏𝓀+ for non-
anomalies such that 𝑎𝓀+ + 𝑏𝓀+ ≥ 1 and ¬𝓀°?¬𝓀°?­𝓀°? ≤ 0.5. 𝓀 
can be treated as a small positive integer constant independent 
of data size since intuitively there should not be many anomaly 
sets in most situations. 
Now define a vector 𝐳 = (𝑧+,… , 𝑧4) where 1 ≤ 𝑧³ ≤ 𝓀 + 1 
indicating if data 𝐱³  is in one of the 𝓀 anomaly sets, and an 
element 𝐏(𝑖, 𝑗) in the correlation matrix above the diagonal is 
viewed as been drawn from beta distribution parametrized by 𝑎5, 𝑏5  if its corresponding data 𝐱5 , 𝐱´  are both in the 𝒾 th 
correlated subset for some 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝓀 (anomalies); otherwise it 
is viewed as been drawn from a beta distribution parametrized 
by 𝑎𝓀+, 𝑏𝓀+ (non-anomalies). 
Beta distribution is a widely used continuous distribution 
over [0,1]  with flexible shape, and the restriction of the 
parameters ensure its unimodality. For simplicity, let 𝑚5 be the 
number of correlations for the 𝑖 th group, and 𝑚𝓀+  be the 
number of all other correlations, and 𝜔5,³ , 𝑙 = 1, … ,𝑚5, 𝑖 =1, … , 𝓀 + 1 be the corresponding correlations. Therefore, the 
likelihood of the correlation matrix is 𝐿(𝐏) =¹º~Γ(𝑎5 + 𝑏5)Γ(𝑎5)Γ(𝑏5)Lb¹𝜔5,³¬bn+1−𝜔5,³­bn+Lb³¼+ ½𝓀+5¼+⇒ ln 𝐿(𝐏) ∝ À((𝑎5 − 1)Àln𝜔5,³Lb³¼+ + (𝑏5 − 1)Àln1 −𝜔5,³
Lb
³¼+
𝓀+
5¼+ + 𝑚5(lnΓ(𝑎5 + 𝑏5) − ln Γ(𝑎5) − lnΓ(𝑏5))) 
Solve for the derivative of each 𝑎5  and 𝑏5 , we have the 
following iteration formulas where 𝜓  denotes digamma 
function, 𝑎5(a), 𝑏5(a) denote the parameter values at the end of the 𝑠 th iteration. The afore-mentioned parameter constraints are 
enforced during the following updates  𝑎5(a+) = 𝜓n+ ~𝜓𝑎5(a) + 𝑏5(a) + ∑ ln𝜔5,³Lb³¼+𝑚5  𝑏5(a+) = 𝜓n+ ~𝜓𝑎5(a) + 𝑏5(a) + ∑ ln1 − 𝜔5,³Lb³¼+ 𝑚5  
After updating beta parameters, the update of 𝑧5 is specified 
by a maximization over a finite support,  𝑧5 = arg maxÄb¼+,…,𝓀+ ln 𝐿(𝐏) 
We use the anomalies detected by rPS as the initialization 
of gPS for 𝐳; then the beta parameters are initialized in a way 
such that the distribution mean is the average correlation of each 
anomaly set while the afore-mentioned constraints are enforced. 
After convergence, the 𝓀 potential anomaly sets are labelled in 𝐳 and we can compute the principal score for each of them. One 
interesting and distinct advantage of gPS is its capability to 
cluster anomalies with strong internal correlations, so the 
detected anomaly set is highly trustable. An example in Figure 
3, where top left brighter square is clustered by gPS, surrounded 
by a region where rPS also detects other anomalies with weaker 
correlations and potential errors. The possible reason for the 
lesser accuracy of rPS is that principal score identifies an 
anomaly if the correlation between a data entry 𝐱5  and the 
principal component is above a threshold; however, this 
correlation mathematically equals 𝐪5(1){𝜌 where {𝜌 is not a 
small quantity, and 𝐪5(1) is the first value of the 𝑖th principal 
component with no known guarantee to be a small quantity. We 
define the anomalies detected by both rPS and gPS as the core 
anomalies, and other detected anomalies as suspicious 
anomalies. A suspicious anomaly can go through further 
analysis that uses historical data to better confirm its identity.  
  
(a) Visualization of two correlation matrices from real data showing gPS 
detects “core” anomalies. Rows and columns are permuted for better 
visualization where anomalies are placed at the top-left corner. 
 
 
(b) Anomalous stock price fluctuations identified by rPS (left) and gPS 
(right) for the same 30-business-day time window. gPS recognied a 
nearly “subset” of what rPS detects, with a higher correlation. The legend 
labels are stock symbols whose full stock name can be found online. 
Figure 3 gPS makes more conservative decision than rPS. 
 
At last, we prove the quadratic time complexity of gPS in 
Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3. gPS Time Complexity. Each iteration of the updates 
for the generative model gPS has at worst 𝑂(𝜑𝑛F)  time 
complexity, where 𝜑 is the percentage of anomalies. 
Proof. The overwhelming time usage is for updating 𝐳. We note 
updating 𝑧5  requires computing the sum “ 𝑎5 ∑ ln𝜔³Lb5¼+ +𝑏5 ∑ ln(1 −𝜔³)Lb5¼+ ” for each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝓀 in the likelihood for those 
addends s.t. 1) correlation 𝜔³ is between 𝐱5 and another data entry; 
2) 𝑖 ∈ Z𝑧5(Æ), 𝑧5(Æ+)[ , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝓀 , i.e. the re-computation is only 
necessary for at most two correlated anomaly sets. In this case, we 
at most need to compute the sum of 𝜑𝑛 “𝜔³” and multiply it to the 
gPS
rPS rPS
gPS
corresponding beta parameters. Since 𝓀 is a small fixed number, 
each round of updating entire 𝐳 needs 𝑂(𝜑𝑛F) complexity.	∎ 
E. Put Together 
In previous discussion 
we described two 
randomized models rPS 
and gPS for correlated 
anomaly detection and 
defined those detected by 
rPS as suspicious 
anomalies and those 
detected by both rPS and 
gPS as core anomalies. 
Now Putting everything together, a proposed data processing 
flow for correlated anomaly detection is shown in Figure 4. Two 
algorithms rPS and gPS are combined into a framework and 
they make a partner to achieve the goal of efficient online 
detection from large streaming data. A sliding window moves 
through the data stream and converts data within the time 
window to feature matrices. Both algorithms require computing 
correlation matrix. The naïve computation costs cubic time 
complexity; fortunately, for online streams we can use the 
recently developed online formula in [19] with quadratic time 
complexity, so that we do not recompute a majority of the 
correlations after the time window slides. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION 
We experiment on two large datasets with time attributes, 
so they can simulate streaming data. The first dataset is a 4-
month ecommerce web server log dataset, which contains 
315,688,764 Apache access log entries and visits from 
2,519,022 distinct IPs. The server is known to be attacked twice 
and constantly harassed by web crawlers possibly collecting 
real-time price information. Given a time window, e.g.1 hour, 
the log data can be converted to a URL-IP matrix where each 
column represents the number of times an IP visits an URL. 
This is a very noisy dataset where the average background 
correlation is higher than 0.5. The second dataset contains all 
daily stock price history of about 7200 U.S. stocks [34], and we 
aim to capture correlated price changes.  
We compare our algorithms to algorithms based on direct 
principal score evaluation [19, 20], referred to as “direct PS”. 
These algorithms have the same nature as the principal score 
evolution from classic PCA, although the recent methods do 
make improvement to speed up evaluation, they do not 
recognize the issue of principal score degeneration. 
Specifically, we use the implementation in [19].  
We also compare to Fraudar, a recent group anomaly 
detection model by [6]. Among all researches we reviewed in 
Section II, this is the only unsupervised model that could be 
applied to our problem. We use their recommended setup, 
except for we do not down-weight nodes with large degrees. For 
social network or spam review detection, large-degree nodes 
can indicate popularity rather anomaly, but our cases are 
obviously different. For the first dataset, we experiment it on 
the URL-IP bipartite graph. On the second dataset, we are only 
able to apply Fraudar on the correlation matrix, treating it as a 
fully connected weighted graph. Although Fraudar does not 
target correlation, the algorithm keeps removing nodes of a 
graph with the least sum of edge weights plus node weights to 
search for a dense subgraph of high anomaly score, thus 
noticeable correlation could be expected if it can truly find the 
dense subgraph. We refer to the principal score of the anomaly 
set identified by Fraudar as Fraudar PS. 
In addition, to deliberately show previous generative 
models for non-correlated group anomalies is ineffective for the 
correlated anomaly detection problem, we experiment with [3] 
on the first dataset since the dataset contains some rich attributes 
like request tokens, response, agent info, etc. We feed in the 
model with all such information. All such generative models do 
not have correlation in their consideration, and we cannot think 
of any part of its design could capture anomalous correlation, 
so we expect their failure. 
For Randomized PS (rPS), we use 𝑝 = 1.4  and 20% 
sampling rate; for Generative PS (gPS) we constrain ¬¬­ ≥ 𝒶 =0.75 for the anomaly set. The alert threshold 𝜌B is set to 0.7 for 
all experiments, but we ignore alerts whose anomaly strength is 
less than 0.1% of the time window. 
A. Qualitative Results for Server Logs 
We run direct principal score evaluation and our 
randomized algorithms on the original data set with 19300+ 1-
hr long sliding window and compare the detection results shown 
in Figure 5 to qualitatively confirm discussions in previous 
sections. The distinct IPs in each window can range from 300 
to 4,000, and the average is 1260. We set the number of anomaly 
sets as 𝓀 = 2 for this experiment. The PS by direct Lanczos 
algorithm raised 264 alerts (12 contains unique discovery), the 
randomized PS raised 5306 alerts (3205 “unique”), the 
Generative PS raised 2845 alerts (853 “unique”), and the 
Fraudar algorithm raised 1022 alerts (only 37 “unique”). The 
two major attacks, roughly between time windows 2500-3000 
and 16000-17000 are well observed in all evaluations.  
We give the following interpretations of the results. 1) The 
pure recursive Lanczos method only responses to time windows 
where the correlated anomalies significantly differ from others 
(IPs that make much more requests than normal IPs). 2) The 
random sampling technique introduced by rPS in Section III.C 
brings out the hidden anomalies, even if the IPs try to simulate 
human-like visit rates, as long as they prevail in the time 
window so that the “anomaly strength” defined in Section III.C 
is strong. 3) both rPS and gPS discover much suspicious IPs that 
could be collecting real-time data from the server, but they 
might not the majority of the data, because the purpose is not to 
overload the server. In this case, as discussed earlier, the 
window principal score is overwhelmed by normal data, and 
therefore the Lanczos itself is not able to discover them, as 
discussed in section III.A and III.B. The generative model gPS 
makes conservative decisions, and is capable of a noticeable 
amount of unique discoveries. 4) The Fraudar algorithm can 
capture correlation when applied on the IP-URL bipartite graph, 
even this is not considered in their design; however, its problem 
is many anomalous IPs in this dataset request the same or even 
less number of URLs than normal IPs in a window, so removing 
them can increase the anomaly score of the remaining, and thus 
many correlated anomalies are treated as normal by the 
algorithm; at last their detected anomaly set only contains those 
made most URL requests; 5) Generative models like MGMM 
based on topic model with Gaussian mixture essentially does 
not model CAD and does not work on our problem. 
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Correlated Anomaly Detection  
 
Figure 5 Correlated anomaly detection results from an ecommerce website 
server log data. Curves are principal scores of the anomaly set detected by 
each algorithm through the timeline. Red dots and magenta dots are alerts, 
where the later indicate the anomaly sets of the alert include unique 
anomalies detected by the algorithm.   
We present the number of data entries and the number of 
detected anomalies of all alerts in Figure 6. For Lanczos PS and 
rPS, we consider the data entries whose correlation with the 
principal component higher than 0.7 as anomalies. For gPS, 
those clustered into the anomaly sets are considered as 
anomalies. It is clear from the chart in general gPS detects less 
anomalies than rPS at the time when they both raise alert, 
confirming the discussion of Figure 3. 
 
Figure 6 Number of data entries and the number of anomalies marked in 
each window. Note different scales are used for better visualization.  
B. Qualitative Results for Stock Price Data 
The stock data set contains daily price series since 1970s. 
We use the data after 1983 so the number of stocks in each time 
window is more than 20. We define 30-business-day as a time 
window and let 3 business days as the sliding step, and use the 
closing price series. At the beginning, there are only dozens of 
stocks; new stocks appear over time, and at the end there are 
near 7000 stocks. This dataset has much lower background 
correlation than the logs, with average window-wide principal 
score around 0.28. We set 𝑘 = 5 for this experiment since we 
expect multiple stock sectors might exhibit correlation. The 
Fraudar algorithm can only be applied on the correlation matrix, 
treating it as a fully connected weighted graph. The results are 
similar to the server log data set. We can in addition observe the 
direct use of PS in Figure 7 makes no detection as the number 
of stocks in each window increase with time. 
Besides, the Fraudar algorithm no longer works. We 
actually can claim Fraudar generally fails for any sufficiently 
densely connected graph, because the key line in their algorithm 
is to “remove a node that best increase the anomaly score of the 
remaining”, which mathematically requires the anomaly score 
of the current subgraph -- the sum of edge weights divided by 
the number of nodes in it -- should be higher than the sum of the 
edge weights of the node to be removed, which is very unlikely 
Table 1 Comparison of Average Recall, Estimated Accuracy and Runtime 
Server Log 
Data Set 
Big Anomaly Sets Few Anomalies with High Strength Hidden Anomalies Overall 
Rec(2) Acu(3) Time(4) Rec Acu Time Rec Acu Time Rec Acu Ex(6) 
dPS(1) (𝜌B = 0.7) 847/0.79 0.835 45/236s 458/0.38 0.735 30/145s 33/0.04 0.506 26/124s 0.45/0.65 0.78 76 
dPS (𝜌B = 0.6) 987/0.93 0.704  726/0.70 0.610  86/0.06 0.442  0.60/0.82 0.66 214 
Fraudar 715/0.31 0.874 1.5/6.5s 862/0.87 0.853 1.7/7.9s 28/0.04 0.573 0.8/3.4s 0.54/0.45 0.86 130 
rPS (𝜌B = 0.7) 952/0.87 0.833 2.3/14s 848/0.85 0.784 2.1/11s 19/0.01 0.544 2.0/6.9s 0.62/0.83 0.81 85 
gPS 801/0.64 0.940 11/19s 603/0.56 0.915 8.7/14s 724/0.68 0.807 4.1/7.5s 0.71/0.61 0.88 13 
rPS + gPS(5) 984/0.90   924/0.92   724/0.68   0.88/0.90   
Stock Price 
Data Set 
Big Anomaly Sets Few Anomalies with High Strength Hidden Anomalies Overall 
Rec Acu Time Rec Acu Time Rec Acu Time Rec Acu Ex 
dPS(1) (𝜌B = 0.7) 325/0.53 0.852 56/320s 97/0.55 0.733 49/252s 28/0.04 0.527 35/145s 0.48/0.69 0.82 20 
dPS (𝜌B = 0.6) 561/0.61 0.658  123/0.70 0.651  45/0.05 0.522  0.58/0.74 0.75 54 
Fraudar Zero detection on all cases. 
rPS (𝜌B = 0.7) 813/0.81 0.827 3.9/26s 884/0.84 0.814 4.1/20s 23/0.01 0.318 3.0/8.1s 0.61/0.83 0.80 23 
gPS 706/0.68 0.846 14/26s 782/0.72 0.928 13.2/22s 815/0.82 0.767 12.5/32s 0.82/0.79 0.86 0 
rPS + gPS(5) 840/0.82   912/0.89   820/0.82   0.89/0.86   
(1) “dPS” represents principal score evaluation by direct us of Lanczos algorithms by [20] and [19]; (2) number of raised alerts (max 1000) and % of detected simulated anomalies; 
(3) % of detected anomalies are from simulation (excluding suspicious anomalies detected from the real data); (4) the average runtime for detection over a time window and the 
max runtime; (5) merging the alerts and detected anomalies increases recall; (6) number of extra detected time windows from the “control group”, an indicator of how likely a 
raised alert is a potential false alarm. 
for a dense graph. Therefore, the algorithm typically terminates 
prematurely, ending up with a large subgraph whose correlation 
is nearly the same as the background correlation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Correlated anomaly detection on a daily U.S. stock price data set, and the 
number of data entries/anomalies marked in each window. 
C. Quantitative Analysis 
To quantitatively evaluate performance, we have to inject 
simulated anomalies to the original data due to lack of gold 
standard and true labels in the data sets we have.  
For the server log data set, we developed a software that 
truly visits the webpages hosted by the server, so the generated 
logs have realistic webpage request sequence and intervals. We 
collect the logs and inject them to 3000 randomly chosen 1-hr 
time windows in three cases, 1000 windows for each: 1) in the 
“big anomaly sets” case, we inject anomalies of various 
anomaly strength to a window to take up 20% to 50% of the 
data entries; 2) in the “strong anomaly strength” case, the 
anomalies take up 5% to 20% of the data with high anomaly 
strength, obeying Assumption 3; 3) the “hidden anomalies” case 
injects 20~200 correlated anomalies with low anomaly strength. 
The three cases cover most of the situations for CAD on the log 
data. The parameter setup is the same as in the qualitative 
analysis. The “core” anomalies identified by gPS from real data 
are removed, while suspicious anomalies are kept for 
reasonable noise. We randomly sample additional 1000 
windows without adding any simulation as the “control group”.  
For the stock price data set, we manually identify 100+ 
likely true anomaly sets (many of them consist of stocks from 
the same sector or related sectors), replicate them in other time 
windows with random scaling plus small random perturbations 
that affect but do not break the correlations, simulating three 
situations like what we do for server logs: 1) “big anomalies” 
mimics the situation when a large number of stocks fluctuate in 
a correlated way, which could happen when the market suffers 
a big turbulence; 2) “strong anomaly strength” is the case when 
a few stocks simultaneously have big price change; 3) “hidden 
anomalies” is the case when a few stocks have mild to tiny 
correlated price changes. Again 1000 30-business-day time 
windows are sampled for each case for injection, with 1000 
additional windows as the “control group” without injection. 
Anomaly sets from the original data identified by gPS are 
removed for the sampled windows.  
Comprehensive performance comparison results are 
shown in Table 1. 
1) We measure how many alerts are raised for each method, 
how many simulated anomalies can be recognized.  
2) We estimate the concept of “accuracy” by calculating the 
percentage of the detected anomalies are from the 
simulation excluding suspicious data entries detected from 
the real data; after such exclusion, remaining real data 
entries are very likely to be non-anomalies.  
3) We count how many alerts are raised for the “control group”, 
which is an indicator how likely each method could give 
false alarms.  
4) Average runtime is also recorded since time cost is an 
important consideration for real-time analysis.  
The evaluation result shows our framework attains best 
performance in terms of recall, the estimated “accuracy” and 
runtime. We have a few remarks for the results:  
1) It confirms naïvely lowering alert threshold would not be a 
good idea as it introduces noticeable false alarms;  
2) rPS is competitive with PS for big anomaly sets, and excels 
in the case of assumption 3; gPS is confirmed to be a more 
conservative method, but its high accuracy makes its alerts 
and detected anomalies most trustable; in the hidden case, 
only gPS is properly working; as a result, our detection 
framework rPS+gPS makes a great partner. 
3) The time cost is dramatically reduced, which makes it 
possible to use the same computational resource to monitor 
much more data;  
The scaling capability of rPS and gPS is shown in Figure 8. 
We randomly sample 100 windows with simulated anomalies 
recognizable by all methods (such window mostly falls in the 
first case of Table 1), and scale the window size up to three 
times by adding likely non-anomalous data. From the left chart, 
the direct PS quickly lose its effectiveness as the data size grows, 
while rPS and gPS maintains reasonable performance, a result 
consistent with our discussion in section III.B and Figure 2. For 
time use, both rPS and gPS significantly outperforms direct PS. 
Theoretically, the direct PS at best has sub-cubic time 
complexity [12, 19, 27]; rPS is sub-cubic time complexity of a 
small coefficient due to the sampling, and gPS is of quadratic 
time of small coefficient proved in Proposition 3. Therefore, the 
scalability and time saving of our framework is a definite 
advantage for large-scale streaming data processing. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Scalability of direct PS, rPS, and gPS. Left: trends of recall as 
data size grows. Right: time use as data size grows.  
As last, we present parameter tuning of our framework in 
Table 2, including the sampling rate 𝓇, the norm order 𝑝 for 
anomaly strength calculation, the constraint 𝒶 on beta mean, 
and the number of anomaly set 𝓀 . The choice of the best 
parameter is the one with best balance between recall and 
accuracy. The best 𝓇  can be viewed as a reflection of 
percentage of anomalies. A larger 𝑝  can help recover more 
anomalies, but in the meantime reduces accuracy. The 𝒶 is the 
average correlation for two data entries in an anomaly set, 
whose best value is no surprisingly near the near the alert 
threshold 𝜌B . Last, the result for 𝓀  confirms generally there 
should not be many anomaly sets in one time window.  
Table 2 Parameter Tuning Results 𝓇 Rec Acu Ex 𝑝 Rec Acu Ex 
0.05 0.722 0.822 78 1 0.632 0.801 45 
0.1 0.803 0.801 82 1.2 0.770 0.788 72 
0.2(1) 0.851 0.784 85 1.4 0.853 0.784 85 
0.3 0.814 0.752 85 1.6 0.884 0.713 124 
0.4 0.766 0.747 83 1.8 0.915 0.602 185 
0.5 0.705 0.741 80 2 0.943 0.541 275 𝒶 Rec Acu Ex 𝓀 Rec Acu Ex 
0.6 0.727 0.787 51 1 0.56 0.915 13 
0.65 0.672 0.822 35 2 0.53 0.924 11 
0.7 0.619 0.874 26 3 0.512 0.939 10 
0.75 0.568 0.915 13 4 0.488 0.957 10 
0.8 0.524 0.923 11 5 0.425 0.966 10 
0.85 0.490 0.935 11 6 0.35 0.97 10 
(1) The chosen parameters for our previous experiments are highlighted. 
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
We target correlated anomaly detection (CAD) in this paper. 
We realize previous approaches cannot be trivially applied on 
large-scale streaming data. The paper first brings up the issue of 
principal score degeneration and contributes a rigorous 
discussion. We then use what is discovered from the proves to 
develop two randomized algorithms rPS and gPS. The 
experiments on two large data sets verify our methods perform 
much better than direct calculation of principal score, and some 
other recent group anomaly detection algorithms. Besides 
performance boost, rPS and gPS significantly reduce the 
computation time and thus also more scalable to large data. 
Our future work can prove the convergence of gPS 
algorithm. This is a mathematically interesting model. When the 
label vector 𝐳 is fixed, it is a fixed-point iteration, and we can 
prove the convergence by showing the fixed-point iteration 
formulas are continuous differentiable and further a contraction. 
However, when 𝐳 is not fixed, the problem is more difficult. 
Another potential future work is anomalous subgraph detection 
on a densely weighted network, as we have seen it can model or 
even equate the CAD problem. We have shown the recent 
model Fraudar fails for this problem, and our model gPS can 
serve as the basis for the research. 
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